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This paper gathers evidence on apparent discrepancies between EU decisions and stock market's 
anticipations of the anti-competitive consequences of particular mergers.  We consider a sample 
of about 100 mergers, which include all phase II cases, and explore some of the factors that may 
account for such discrepancies.  Overall, we find a low frequency of type I discrepancies, i.e. 
relatively few instances where the Commission has prohibited a merger that the market had 
anticipated as being pro-competitive.  By contrast, we observe a high frequency of type II 
discrepancies, i.e. relatively numerous instances where the Commission failed to block or to 
impose remedies on mergers that the market had anticipated to be anti-competitive.   We argue 
that type II discrepancies could be associated with the scope of the dominance concept, the lack 
of an explicit efficiency defence or the political economy of merger control, such that the 
Commission has not pursued the objective that it has been assigned.  By contrast, type I 
discrepancies can only be associated with the political economy of merger control.  Considering 
the pattern of discrepancies (across countries, across incentives to influence the Commission and 
over time), some  preliminary observations reveal that competitors may play an important role in 
favour of anti-competitive deals but surprisingly not against pro-competitive mergers,  that 
discrepancies are more frequent in phase I  and possibly when large countries are involved.   
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relatively few instances where the Commission has prohibited a merger that the market had 
anticipated as being pro-competitive.  By contrast, we observe a high frequency of type II 
discrepancies, i.e. relatively numerous instances where the Commission failed to block or to 
impose remedies on mergers that the market had anticipated to be anti-competitive.   We argue that 
type II discrepancies could be associated with the scope of the dominance concept, the lack of an 
explicit efficiency defence or the political economy of merger control, such that the Commission 
has not pursued the objective that it has been assigned.  By contrast, type I discrepancies can only 
be associated with the political economy of merger control.  Considering the pattern of 
discrepancies (across countries, across incentives to influence the Commission and over time), 
some  preliminary observations reveal that competitors may play an important role in favour of 
anti-competitive deals but surprisingly not against pro-competitive mergers,  that discrepancies are 
more frequent in phase I  and possibly when large countries are involved.   
  
 
"it boils down to whether you trust the agencies or the stock market.  I'll take the 




I.   Introduction 
 
The purpose of this paper is to gather and interpret some evidence with respect to the first ten years of EU 
merger control’s implementation. In particular, we present some evidence on apparent discrepancies 
between EU decisions and stock market's anticipations of the anti-competitive consequences of particular 
mergers. Finally, we explore some of the factors that may account for such discrepancies.  
We identify, for a sample of mergers, whether the stock market anticipated that the operation would 
benefit consumers by considering the reaction to the stock price of the competitors. We consider this 
evidence in the light of the actual decisions taken by the EU. The comparison reveals both type I and type II 
“discrepancies”, i.e. instances where on the face of it, the Commission “should have” allowed a merger that 
it has prohibited and instances where the Commission has allowed a merger that it “should have“ 
prohibited. We identify three factors, which may explain systematic discrepancies (beyond differences in 
assessment which would presumably introduce some random noise). First, the objective of the EC Merger 
Regulation (ECMR) may not be to prevent mergers which hurt consumers because of the incomplete 
overlap between dominance and significant increases in price. Significant price increases may indeed take 
place without leading to the creation or strengthening of a dominant position. Second, a discrepancy 
between the stock market's anticipation of the anti-competitive consequences of a merger and actual 
decisions could be associated with a bias in the evaluation of efficiencies. Indeed, we observe that the 
ECMR necessarily makes an implicit assumption about a benchmark level of efficiencies. Excessive 
optimism by the Commission with respect to this benchmark could explain why some mergers are allowed 
when the market anticipates that the merger will be anti-competitive. Third, the discrepancies may be 
associated with the “political economy” of merger control, i.e. influence that is brought to bear on the 
Commission so that it may not have followed the objective that it has been assigned.  
The last factor has been much emphasized in recent discussions and deserves a more detailed 
discussion. First, the Commission is sometimes criticized for giving excessive attention to the 
welfare of competing firms. According to some observers, the Commission’s attention to the 
concerns of competitors is associated with its apparent willingness to listen to them and the 
credence that it attaches to their point of view.
2 The Commission may rely excessively on the 
claims that they put forward and fail to realise to what extent the interests of consumers and those 
of competitors may diverge. However, there is a more benign interpretation behind the observation 
that the Commission tends to consider the fate of competitors. Its attention could be partly dictated 
by the substantive criteria under which the Commission operates and in particular the dominance 
criteria; arguably, a firm’s ability to act independently of its competitors might indeed depend 
heavily on the fate of these competitors
3.  
                                                 
1 Bruce Kobayashi, former economist as the FTC and Department of Justice  (Antitrust division), quoted in Fortune 
Magazine, April 14th, 1997.  
2 For instance, C. James (Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust at the US Department of Justice) pointed out that US 
antitrust laws protect “competition and not competitors” and note a “significant point of divergence” with the EU on 
the issue (see James, 2001). 
3 See Kovacic, 2001. He discusses why US and EC authorities had a divergent assessment in the Boeing/McDonnell 
Douglas case. He shows that the source of the divergence is the EU’s concern about the entrenchment of dominance 
which arose even though the EU had recognised that McDonnell was no longer a real force. Second, the Merger Task Force (MTF) is sometimes critizised for relying on somewhat speculative 
claims; that is, it is sometimes asserted that the anti-competitive concerns identified by the 
Commission lack solid foundations, in particular in terms of economic analysis, or that there is 
insufficient empirical support behind these concerns (see for instance Muris, 2001). The recent 
decision by the Court of First Instance in the Airtours case supports this point of view. In its ruling, 
the Court criticizes the Commission for insufficient reasoning in its analysis of collective 
dominance, for having relied on insufficient evidence and for not having adequately considered the 
evidence submitted by the parties. In addition to collective dominance, the MTF’s approach to 
geographic market definition and portfolio effects has been the subject of concern. However, it is 
inevitable that any anti-trust authority should have a margin of appreciation, and the burden of 
proof that the Commission should appropriately carry is a matter of degree. 
Third, the Commission’s approach is sometimes characterized as being biased against small 
countries. As discussed in the chapter by Horn and Stennek, the concern underlying this criticism 
seems to be that current EU policy prevents firms in small countries “from merging and obtain a 
leading global position”. This critique can be interpreted in several ways, which are fully discussed 
by Horn and Stennek. At least one version of this critique suggests that large member states are in 
a position to exert more influence on the Commission's decisions. However, while there is some 
evidence that member states could influence Commissioners in the early years of merger control 
(see Neven et al, 1993), the current Commissioner is widely credited for his independence and for 
protecting his staff from political influence (see for instance, Burnside, 2001).  
According to some commentators (see for instance Alhborn, 2002), the origin of these 
shortcomings can be traced back to the institutional framework in which EU merger control 
operates and in particular to the multiple roles played by the Commission, which essentially acts as 
investigator, judge and jury. According to this approach, EU merger control is not sufficiently 
accountable and its decision making process enjoys excessive discretion. In this context, individual 
civil servants, and more generally the hierarchy of the MTF, can pursue their own objectives at the 
expenses of those assigned by the regulation. These interests and objectives can in turn be 
manipulated by third parties, including competitors and member governments.
4 In other words, 
according to this approach, bureaucratic capture is at the source of the shortcomings of EU merger 
control and those can thus only be addressed by making the Commission more directly 
accountable.
5  
This paper considers some direct evidence on the issue of whether the Commission may have pursued 
different interests from those that is has been assigned, taking the anticipation of the financial market as a 
benchmark. The paper characterizes the pattern of discrepancies
6 between decisions and market 
anticipations across various dimensions and tries to account for them. We discuss the respective role played 
                                                 
4 See Neven, Nuttal and Seabright (1993) for a discussion of this and some evidence relating to the first five years of 
EU merger control. See Neven and Röller (2001) for a model where third parties can influence the decision of a 
competition agency which is subject to ex post monitoring by the government. 
5 Public attention has also focused on a number of cases like Volvo/Scania, Airtours, Worldcom/MCI, 
Schneider/Legrand, GE/Honeywell or Tetra Laval/Sidel. Senior executives of the companies involved have openly 
expressed dissatisfaction with the outcome of the procedure (as one might have expected) but also with the procedure 
itself (see for instance, Financial Times, October 29th, 2001). They claim that the MTF has abused the power that it 
has been granted by the regulation and in all but one of the cases mentioned above, companies have appealed the 
Commission’s decision to the Court of Justice. These decisions to appeal presumably give an indication both that the 
companies do not consider to have been granted a fair hearing and that they anticipate that a different decision may be 
reached on appeal, thereby indicating possibly that, according to their perception, the Commission did not pursue in its 
decision the objectives that it had been assigned.  
6 Discrepancies may be a more appropriate term than “errors”, given that the rules imposed by the ECMR can explain 
the divergence between decisions and what the stock anticipation may have dictated and given that the assessment of 
the competitive consequences of potential mergers from stock market data suffers from its own shortcomings. by the concept of dominance, the lack of an explicit efficiency defence and the influence that third parties 
could be expected to exercise. 
We find a low frequency of type I discrepancies, i.e. relatively few instances where the 
Commission has prohibited a merger that the market had anticipated as being pro-competitive. By 
contrast, we observe a high frequency of type II discrepancies, i.e. relatively numerous instances 
where the Commission has failed to block or to impose remedies on mergers that the market had 
anticipated to be anti-competitive. Considering the pattern of discrepancies (across countries, 
across incentives to lobby and over time), some very preliminary observations reveal that 
competitors play an important role in favour of anti-competitive deals but surprisingly not against 
pro-competitive mergers, that discrepancies are more frequent in phase I and possibly when large 
countries are involved.  
II.  A benchmark from the stock market 
 
As indicated above, we consider a sample of merger cases reviewed by the EU and derive the stock 
market’s implicit anticipation of the consequences of the proposed mergers for the consumers. We then 
compare actual decisions with what the stock market would have indicated if the objective of the EU were 
to prevent price increases. We discuss these discrepancies and identify the circumstances where, 
independently of any outside influence, the MTF could allow a price-increasing merger, or prohibit a 
merger that reduces price. This section first describes the method that we use in order to infer the stock 
market’s implicit anticipation of mergers’ consequences for the consumers. We subsequently outline our 
understanding of the objective function assigned by the ECMR and the constraints that it imposes, and 
finally describe our sample.  
 
II.1. Identification of anti-competitive mergers from competitors’ profits 
 
The consequences of a merger for merging parties, competitors and consumers in the context of a 
prototype model are described in Figure 1. It is assumed that before the merger, N firms compete 
with the same marginal cost. The new entity, which results from the merger (involving M firms out 
of N) is assumed to operate with a lower marginal cost. The marginal cost saving achieved by the 
merger (relative to the common pre-merger level) is represented on the horizontal axis and dubbed 
e (for efficiency). The vertical axis represents the profits. The four curves in Figure 1 present 
respectively; the change in the profit of merging parties (that is, the level of profit of the merged 
entity less the sum of the individual profits of the merging parties before the merger, denoted  m Π ); 
the change in the profit of competitors (all firms not involved in the merger, denoted  c Π ); the 
change in the consumer surplus (denoted CS ); and the change in welfare (defined as the sum of 










There are five striking features from this figure. First, it is immediately apparent that mergers will be not 
attractive (both privately and in terms of welfare) if they do not achieve at least some level of efficiency. 
Second, the change in consumer surplus increases as the level of efficiency achieved by the merger 
increases. This accords with intuition, as part of the efficiency achieved by the merged entity will be passed 
on to consumers. Third, when the efficiency is large enough, the reduction in the number of competitors 
entailed by the merger, which normally leads to higher prices, is more than compensated by the effect of 
higher efficiency, which leads to lower prices, other things being equal. As indicated by Figure 2.1, there is 
a critical level of efficiency (e’) which ensures that the merger does not affect consumers. At this critical 
level, prices are unchanged. Fourth, the change in welfare is also increasing with the level of efficiency. 
Higher efficiency leads to higher aggregate profits (this is not shown) and higher consumer surplus, thereby 
increasing welfare. Figure 1 also indicates the level of efficiency, ẽ, which is required in order to ensure that 
welfare increases as a consequence of the merger. This level is naturally less than the level, which is 
required to ensure that consumers are not hurt. Fifth, and most importantly for our purpose, we observe that 
the change in profits accruing to competitors mirrors the changes in consumer surplus: profits to com-
petitors fall as the level of efficiency achieved by the merger increases and the level of efficiency which 
ensures that competitors do not gain is exactly the level which ensures that consumers are not hurt. In other 
words, in this framework, if a merger hurt competitors, it will benefit consumers and vice versa. That is also 
to say that if we can obtain a reliable measure of the extent to which competitors could be hurt by a merger, 
we will also have a measure of whether the merger is pro-competitive (i.e. benefits consumers).  
The idea that mergers, which hurt competitors, will tend to be pro-competitive has long been 
recognized and has been first exploited by Eckbo (1983). He proposes to use the stock market 
reaction to the announcement of a merger (a so called “event study”) to evaluate the impact of the 
merger on competitors’ profits. A positive reaction will normally indicate that the merger is 
expected to enhance the profits of competitors and hence that it will be anti-competitive (and vice-
versa). The change in the value of competitors’ equity can also be taken as a measure of the 
(discounted) additional profits that is expected to accrue to them as a consequence of the merger. 
In what follows, we will adopt this methodology and accordingly identify mergers that were 
expected to be anti-competitive from reactions in the equity of competitors.  
Questions naturally arise with respect to the generality of the above framework in which 




ee   e 
effieciency
 π profits of stock market returns as a proxy for the change in competitors’ profits. We take each question in 
turn.  
The consequences of a merger for competitors and consumers outlined in the framework above 
accord with intuition. Formally, this intuition holds for standard models like Cournot competition 
and homogenous products (with general demand functions
7). The shape of the profit and consumer 
surplus functions also hold for some specifications with product differentiation and/or Bertrand 
competition.
8 The exact correspondence between the sign of the change in competitors’ profits and 
the change in consumer surplus depends on the assumption of Cournot competition. However, as 
long as the level of efficiency which guarantees that competitors’ profits are unchanged remains in 
the neighbourhood of the efficiency level e’, our analysis should continue to yield empirically 
informative results.  
Nevertheless, a number of limitations of the above framework need to be emphasised. First, it is 
assumed that competitors will not be weakened to the point that they will prefer to leave the 
industry.
9 If this would arise, both competitors and consumers could be hurt. Second, our 
framework assumes that the efficiency of competitors is not affected by the merger. This may not 
be appropriate in the presence of technological spillover across firms so that part of the efficiency 
gains also accrue to competitors. In those circumstances, the correspondence between competitor 
gains and consumer losses may no longer hold. Competitors and consumers could gain at the same 
time. Third and most importantly, this framework focuses on unilateral effects in horizontal 
mergers. With respect to co-ordinated effects, the matter may not be very different, to the extent 
that competitors are expected to gain and consumers are expected to loose (whatever the efficiency 
gain). However, conglomerate mergers may lead to outcomes where the correspondence between 
the change in consumer surplus and the change in competitor profits is lost. For instance, when 
merging firms sell complement goods as a bundle (as in GE/Honeywell with avionics and engines), 
competitors will typically loose even though consumers may gain or loose depending of particular 
features of demand. Similarly tied sales of substitute or independent goods will typically hurt 
consumers but may increase or decrease competitors’ profits depending again on particular 
features of demand.
10  
Let us now turn to the measurement of competitors’ expected profits. As indicated above, the 
change in the expected profit of competitors associated with a merger is typically measured by a 
so-called event study, which attributes “abnormal” changes in their stock price or equity value to 
the merger around the day of its announcement. Leaving technical issues aside for the moment 
(such as the identification of abnormal changes in stock prices), a number  of issues of 
interpretation should be kept in mind; first, the annoucement of a merger may have little effect on 
the stock price of competitors, in particular when the merger affects only a small part of the 
business of the firms being considered.  Second, when participants in the stock market contemplate 
several possible mergers, the announcement of a particular merger will change the likelihood of 
many alternative configurations.
11 As a consequence, a change in the stock price of a firm not 
                                                 
7 This property holds for the so called “smooth Cournot games”, as defined by Vives (2000). A proof of this can be 
obtained upon request from the authors.  
8 For instance, these properties hold for a symmetric system of product differentiation à la Shubik and Levitan (1980). 
See Neven (2001) for a derivation of this result in a different context.  
9 However the concern that competitors may be led to leave the industry has not been prominently raised in the merger 
decisions that are included in our sample (our sample only includes decisions until the summer of 2000, whereas 
GE/Honeywell and Tetra Laval/Sidel have been prohibited in 2001). 
10 Our sample includes only a few cases where “conglomerate” concerns were raised (in particular, Tetra Pak/Alfa 
Laval and Guinness/Grand Metropolitan). 
11More generally, it should be recognized that the stock market could anticipate clearance and prohibitions. At the time 
of the announcement, the market surely takes into account the antitrust procedure and attributes a probability to the involved in the merger may reflect more the change in the likelihood of alternative mergers in-
volving that firm (the “in play” effect) rather than the consequences of the announced merger for 
its profit (see Stennek and Fridolfsson, 2001). If one assumes that the market anticipated an 
increase in the value of the “competitor” in alternative merger configurations, a fall in its stock 
price may not be a reliable indicator that the merger is pro-competitive (but an increase in its stock 
price will remain a good indicator that the merger is anti-competitive). It is not clear however 
whether this “in play” effect is important empirically; Salinger and Shuman (1988) test for the 
presence of such effects and conclude that it may matter in some cases, but it does not matter on 
average across a sample of cases. Third, it is worth keeping in mind that abnormal returns around 
the day of announcement may provide a fairly imprecise estimate of the change in profits. How-
ever, as confirmed by Schwert (1996), there is a lot of evidence in support of the semi-strong 
hypothesis of market efficiency with respect to mergers. Hence, the change in stock prices is likely 
to provide an unbiased estimate of the change in profit. Nevertheless, the variance around this 
estimate could be large.  
 
II.2 Matching markets and regulators 
 
As discussed in the previous section, the anticipation by the stock market of the anti-competitive 
consequences of a merger can be inferred from competitors’ stock prices. In order to identify possible 
discrepancies between the anticipation of the market and the decision of the regulators, one should clarify 
what the regulator was meant to achieve.  
The ECMR is concerned with the creation or reinforcement of a dominant position as a result of which 
effective competition would be significantly impeded (Article 2.3). The regulation also indicates that 
efficiencies can be taken into account in the analysis as long as consumers are not hurt (Article 2.1b). 
Altogether, the objective set by the ECMR would thus appear to involve the protection of consumer 
welfare. According to this approach, the Commission would be expected to consider potential price 
increases and evaluate whether efficiencies are sufficient to ensure that prices would fall (i.e. make sure, in 
terms of Figure 2.1 that the actual level of efficiency is above e’). According to this approach, it is 
straightforward to assess whether the Commission has pursued the objective that it was assigned; all it takes 
is to check the sign of the expected change in competitors’ profit. If it is positive and the merger has been 
prohibited, then the Commission has taken the “right” decision, and vice versa. Of course, some difference 
in appreciation between markets and regulators could take place so that different outcomes will be 
observed. But there should be no systematic bias induced by differences in appreciation.  
Two difficulties arise, however, with this interpretation. The first difficulty arises from the concept 
of dominance, which is not closely associated with the prospect for price increases that hurt 
consumers. That is, the Commission may have found that a merger does not create or strengthen 
dominance even if a price increase can be expected or the other way round. If anything, it would 
appear that significant price increases could take place even if dominance is not created or 
strengthened. There has been increasing recognition of this in the context of the debate 
surrounding the Green Paper on the reform of the ECMR (see Vickers, 2002, for a succinct view 
on this). This arises because firms with moderate market share may still be able to achieve 
                                                                                                                                                                  
merger being cleared. Hence, the change in the value of the stock at the time of the announcement is equal to the 
probability that the deal will be cleared times the value that will accrue if it is realised. In order to identify whether 
deals are perceived as anti-competitive or not, we only use the sign of the expected change in the stock price. The 
expected change is of the same sign as the conditional change (i.e. given that the merger takes place), the former being 
a proportion of the latter. Hence, the fact that the market may anticipate the outcome of the antitrust procedure does 
not introduce a bias in our procedure. significant price increases if they sell close substitutes
12. Hence, a finding that the Commission has 
not prohibited a merger that is expected to increase price may be due to the fact that the firms 
involved fell short of being dominant – and not the fact that the Commission has not pursued the 
objective that it was assigned. By contrast, a finding that the Commission has prohibited a merger, 
which was not expected to increase price, could not be explained by the scope of the concept of 
dominance.  
The second difficulty arises from the observation that efficiency considerations are very seldom 
considered explicitly in actual decisions. As pointed out by Röller et al (2001), the objective of 
protecting consumer welfare and the Commission’s apparent neglect of efficiency considerations 
would be hard to square with the fact that most mergers are allowed. Indeed, if no efficiency is 
ever taken into account, all horizontal mergers should be prohibited. Hence, the Commission’s 
objective is probably best described as the protection of consumer welfare, while assuming a 
certain level of efficiency. According to this approach, it is only where competitive concerns are 
serious that the Commission may explicitly explore whether efficiency gains much exceed the 
benchmark level, which is assumed for all cases.
13 To the best of our knowledge, the Commission 
has never found such a situation or at least has never publicly said so.  
Hence, the absence of a systematic evaluation of efficiencies in each case could involve a bias in 
Commission decisions; if the benchmark level of efficiency which is assumed by the Commission 
exceeds average efficiency gains, mergers which hurt consumers could be allowed by the 
Commission. The opposite, however, is not true because the Commission’s approach is 
asymmetric,
14 if the Commission finds that there is a competitive concern and that the benchmark 
level of efficiency is insufficient to ensure that prices will not increase, it will investigate actual 
efficiencies. Assuming that its evaluation is not biased, it will normally estimate the actual level of 
efficiency and hence will not prevent mergers which exhibit sufficient efficiency to ensure that 
prices do not increase.  
In sum, mergers which hurt consumers could be allowed for three distinct reasons. First, mergers 
could lead to a price increase, but not create or strengthen dominance. Second, the benchmark 
level of efficiency, which is assumed by the Commission, could be biased upwards. Finally, it 
could be that mergers have been allowed because the Commission did not pursue the objective that 
it has been assigned, possibly under the influence of the merging entity and its competitors. By 
contrast, there is only one systematic reason
15 which may explain why mergers which benefit 
                                                 
12 Or to put it differently because a firm typically needs to be the largest in the market in order to be considered 
dominant.  The absence of a clear doctrine on collective dominance in the early years may also be a significant factor - 
such that mergers that lead to collusion could not be considered to give rise to a dominant position.   
13 This interpretation is consistent with the wording of the regulation and t with some of the rare references to 
efficiency that one finds in actual decisions. For instance, in Aérospatiale-Alénia/De Havilland (a prohibition), the 
Commission acknowledged that it had considered efficiencies but that efficiencies were not sufficient to overturn the 
presumption that the merger was anti-competitive. Some observers however doubt that the Commission pays more 
than lip service to efficiency claims put forward by the parties (see Röller et al, 2001 for instance). The fact that the 
Commission may have turned efficiency into an offence in some cases should also induce some reluctance on the part 
of merging parties in claiming efficiencies. This may further contribute to an effective neglect of efficiency 
considerations.  
14 If one assumes (see previous footnote) that the Commission hardly ever considers efficiencies, then both types of 
discrepancies could arise. Mergers which benefit consumers could be prohibited.  
15 Different discount factors could be another source of discrepancy, in particular if the regulator gives more weight to 
the immediate future and if efficiencies only accrue after a lag (so that a pro-competitive merger first appears to be 
anti-competitive).  consumers are prohibited, namely that the Commission did not follow the objective that it had 
been assigned, possibly under the influence of competitors.
16  
One should however note that the Commission does not consider that the scope of the dominance 
concept has been a constraint and hence that it could account for possible discrepancies. The Green 
Paper (EU, 2001) on the reform on the ECMR, while discussing the wisdom of changing the 
substantive test, acknowledges that some mergers which increase price may not be covered by the 
concept of dominance. However, the Green Paper dismisses this as an “interesting hypothetical 
discussion” and notes that the Commission has never experienced a case where this has been an 
issue (see para 166, page 40).  
 
II.3 Data and Results  
 
Our sample includes all phase II mergers reviewed by the EU during the first ten years of implementation of 
the ECMR (until mid-2000), and a matching sample of phase I cases (that were selected randomly). For 
each case, we have identified merging firms and competitors from the decision and the date of the 
announcement from the financial press. For each firm (merging firm or competitor), we have computed the 
abnormal return
17 on the day of announcement as well as the abnormal change in the value of equity. We 
add the change in the value of equity across merging partners to obtain an aggregate measure of the value of 
merging firms. When several competitors are identified in the decision (as is often the case, in particular 
when several relevant markets are considered), we have added the change in the value of equity across 
firms to obtain the aggregate effects on competitors. Because of difficulties in identifying competitors or 
their stock, we end up with 48 phase II cases (out of 64 phase II cases during the period under review) for 
which we have complete information. We encountered more difficulty in identifying competitors in phase I 
cases, which are typically less detailed and had to draw additional cases.
18 We end up with a sample of 57 
phase I cases. The list of cases included in the final sample is provided in the Appendix.  
Table 1. A sample of decisions taken by the Commission during 1990-2000 
  PHASE I  PHASE II   
  Art. 6.1.b 
Clearance 














                                                 
16 If the influence that different parties can exercise on the Commission is proportional to the resources that they 
devote, such an outcome should not be observed as the merging parties should always be in a position to trump the 
competitors, at least in the context of the prototype model considered above (see Neven and Röller, 2001, for a formal 
analysis of this in a common agency framework). 
17 Several methods can be used to compute abnormal returns. Some authors estimate a Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) equation which regresses the stock return on a constant and the market return (or an industry index) over a 
sample which immediately precedes a window of about 100 days around the announcement. Abnormal returns before 
the announcement are then computed as the difference between actual returns and the predicted returns obtained from 
the estimated equation. For the part of the window which follows the announcement, a symmetric procedure is used 
(such that a second CAPM equation is estimated on a sample which immediately follows the windows and use to 
compute normal returns during the second part of the window). Abnormal returns are then cumulated over the span of 
the window to obtain a cumulated abnormal return.  
A much simpler approach can be followed, in which the abnormal return is simply computed at the difference between the return on the stock and 
the return on an appropriate index on the day of announcement. Given the difficulty in obtaining unbiased parameter estimates in CAPM equations 
(in particular when the stock accounts for a significant proportion of the index), we have adopted this simpler approach. We have obtained all stock 
prices, equity values and indices from Datastream. 
18 Our sample includes approximately the same number of phase I cases that have been allowed with remedies and 
phase I cases that have been allowed without remedies. This partly reflects the more detailed information which is 
provided in decisions for which remedies have been imposed. Relative to the actual population of phase I decisions, 
our sample thus over-represents cases where competitive concern has been found (during the sample period, there are 
45 phase I decisions with remedies and 982 decisions without remedies). Overall our sample thus includes all phase II 
cases and about 2/3 of phase I cases in which remedies have been imposed. Negative gains  
(pro-competitive)  14  18 7 17  2  58 
Positive Gains 
(anti-competitive)  15  10 3 13  6  47 
  29 28 10 30  8  105 
 
Table 1 reports the number of cases in our sample according to the decisions taken by the Commission and 
according to the stock market evaluation of their competitive consequences.  
First, we observe across all decisions that 55 % were considered to be pro-competitive. That is also 
to say that the distribution of efficiency gains across mergers has a median which is only slightly 
above the level of efficiency which would ensure that consumers are not hurt (e' in Figure 2.1). 
This observation should be contrasted with the usual finding of event studies such that a majority 
of mergers fail to generate value for the shareholders of acquirers (even though the variance is 
large and some mergers generate very high returns), such that target shareholders obtain handsome 
premia and such that acquirers and target shareholders combined earn small but positive returns on 
average (see Bruner, 2002, for a survey). Leaving aside the issue of the allocation of the value 
being generated across merging firms (acquirer and target) and the puzzle that many mergers are 
not expected to generate value ex ante for acquirers, these observations suggest, in terms of Figure 
2.1, that the average level of efficiency associated with potential mergers is fairly low (close to the 
point where the sum of profits would cross the horizontal axis). Hence, it would appear that the 
average
19 level of efficiency, as inferred from the stock market reaction of competitors is 
significantly larger than the average level of efficiency which can be inferred from the stock 
market reaction of merging firms.
20 This observation is a bit of a puzzle. One possible 
interpretation is that mergers do generate significant efficiencies which affect competitors but that 
the shareholders of the merging firms do not manage to obtain the rents associated with these 
efficiencies (possibly in part because of ineffective corporate control).
21 If this interpretation is 
correct, it would suggest that the common presumption that efficiencies associated with mergers 
tend to be small, which relies on evidence of gains to merging firms, could be misplaced. Gains 
may have been underestimated. 
Table 1 distinguishes between different types of decisions depending on the article of the Merger 
Regulation that was applied. In phase I, matters are clear with respect to Article 6.1.b decisions 
which refer to clearance without conditions. Similarly in phase II, Article 8.1 and 8.3 refer 
respectively to clearance without conditions and prohibition. The issue then arises of how to 
interpret Article 6.1b and 8.2 decisions which include undertakings (respectively in phase I and 
phase II). Whether a decision with undertaking can be seen as giving rise to a discrepancy with the 
assessment of the stock market depends crucially on what the stock market could anticipate. That 
is, if the stock market could not anticipate the imposition of remedies, any instance where the stock 
market anticipated that the merger would be anti-competitive does not give rise to discrepancy if 
one assumes that remedies do indeed meet the competitive concerns. Similarly, any instance where 
the stock market anticipated that the merger would be pro-competitive does not give rise to a 
discrepancy – except to the extent that the remedies may not have been necessary. Hence, if the 
                                                 
19 Assuming that the average is close to the median. 
20 The usual finding with respect to the creation of value for merging firms is broadly confirmed in our sample. We 
find 51 cases (out of 105) in which the merger creates value for the merging firms.  
21 This interpretation would also be consistent with the observation from ex post studies that most mergers do not 
generate additional profits relative a control group, as long as the rents appropriated by management are recorded as 
additional costs and hence reduce reported profits.  market does not anticipate the remedies, neither 6.1.b nor 8.2 decisions should be considered as 
potential discrepancies.  
The matter is different if one assumes that the stock market could anticipate the remedies. In this 
case, any instance where the market anticipates that the merger would be anti-competitive would 
be associated with a type II discrepancy. But of course, any instance where the market anticipates 
that the merger would be pro-competitive would not be associated with a discrepancy. Hence, the 
frequency of type II discrepancies depends crucially on what we assume about the anticipation of 
the stock market. In what follows and in the absence of any clear presumption in favour of either, 
we will consider both assumptions, even if we tend to favour the assumption that the market could 
not anticipate the remedies.
22  
Table 1 indicates that the frequency of type I discrepancies, such that the Commission has 
prohibited seemingly pro-competitive mergers, at 25 %, is relatively low, even if one should not 
possibly attach too much weight to this observation given the low overall number of prohibitions 
in the sample
23 (only 8 out of 13 prohibitions effectively imposed by mid-2000). As indicated 
above, type I discrepancies can only be explained by outside influence that may have led the 
Commission to pursue an objective which is different from the one that it has been assigned 
(assuming that the efficiency defense is asymmetric). Of course, competitors, which are hurt by 
pro-competitive mergers, would have an incentive to lobby against these mergers. This hypothesis 
will be further investigated below.  
The frequency of type II discrepancies, i.e. situations where the Commission has allowed 
seemingly anti-competitive mergers, is larger (see Table 1); the frequency of discrepancy among 
those cases which do not involve remedies is 46 %. If one includes cases involving remedies and 
assumes that the market did not anticipate remedies, the frequency is 19 %. If one assumes that the 
market did anticipate remedies, the frequency is 42 %. Frequencies in the range of 40 % seems 
rather large, being close to what one would obtain if decisions and the anti-competitive 
consequences were independent discrete random variables.  
As discussed above, at least three reasons can explain type II discrepancies, namely the scope of 
the dominance concept, the lack of an explicit efficiency defence and the influence that third 
parties can bring to bear on the Commission. If one follows the Commission and dismisses the 
limited scope of dominance as being unimportant, it would seem that only excessive optimism 
with respect to efficiencies and outside influence could explain type II discrepancies. Given the 
importance of such discrepancies, it would seem likely that both should play a role. However, 
additional information is required in order to disentangle the two. The last section of the paper uses 
the variance in the discrepancies across countries, time and incentive to influence in order to 
explore the issue.  
III.   The pattern of discrepancies  
 
In order to further investigate the role of efficiencies and outside influence on the probability of observing 
discrepancies, we compute the correlation between discrepancies and a number of variables which represent 
different sources of outside influence. Various sources have been discussed above. First, competitors and 
merging firms can be expected to influence the agency; merging firms will do so in order to enhance the 
probability that the deal will be accepted and we will represent this incentive by the expected profit that 
firms accruing to the merging firms (at the time of announcement). This variable is denoted MGAINS. The 
                                                 
22 Purely on the grounds that remedies are the outcome of a negotiation between the Commission and the parties over 
which it is difficult to form a prior.  
23 Interestingly, one of the two cases identified as a type I discrepancy is Airtours/First Choice. Some comfort can 
presumably be found from the fact that the discrepancy has been redressed by the Court of First Instance, at least in 
law, if not in terms of business opportunity. incentive of competitors depends on the effect of the merger on their profit; if the merger is expected to 
increase their profit, they will influence the agency in the same direction as the merging firms. We denote 
as PCGAINS the expected profit accruing to competitors at the time of announcement, when positive. At 
the opposite, when the merger is expected to decrease their profit (and hence is pro-competitive), competi-
tors can be expected to influence the agency against the merger. We denote as NCGAINS the absolute 
value of the expected loss of profits to competitors.  
Second, as discussed above, some observers suggest that there is a bias against small countries and 
in particular that there is a bias against mergers involving firms from the same country. We 
represent this by a dummy variable (CSPEC) which take the value 1 if the merging firms come 
from the same country. Another version of the “small country” argument is that large countries are 
in a better position to influence the Commission. We represent this by a dummy variable (BIG) 
which takes the value 1 if one of the merging company has its headquarter and main operation in 
one of the large EU countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain or the UK).  
In addition, in order to investigate whether discrepancies may become more frequent over time, we 
consider a variable (N), which is the chronological order of the case. We also introduce a dummy 
(PHASE1) to identify decisions taken in phase I.  
Table 3 presents the correlation
24 between our preferred measure of discrepancy and these 
variables.
25 The discrepancy variable (MISTAKE) is a dummy variable, which identifies all cases 
of discrepancies (both tape I and type II) and assumes that remedies could not be anticipated.  
Looking at Table 3 a few interesting findings can be identified. First, it appears that the probability of 
observing a discrepancy is higher in Phase I. Second, when competitors gain from the merger, their 
incentive to influence the agency is positively correlated with the occurrence of discrepancies. By contrast, 
when competitors loose, their incentive to influence the agency against the merger is negatively correlated 
with the occurrence of discrepancies. However, one should not attach too much significance to this finding, 
which is based on very few observations. Third, the occurrence of mistakes seems to be more frequent when 
companies from large countries are involved (but the level of significance of this variable is low). Finally, 
the preliminary data exploration in Table 3 suggests that there is no apparent bias against mergers which 
involve firms from the same country and no evidence that discrepancies are more frequent over time.  
Overall, the analysis confirms that the influence that competitors can bring to bear on the 
Commission may be associated with type II discrepancies. That is, competitors may be successful 
in influencing the Commission to allow mergers that it should not allow according to the objective 
that it has been assigned. Interestingly, if this finding confirms the importance of competitors in 
the political economy of EU merger control, it is not consistent with the claim (for instance in 
GE/Honeywell), namely that competitors can influence the Commission to prohibit cases that it 
should allow.  
The analysis also suggests that increasing the period of time during which the Commission has to 




Evaluating merger decisions ex post is a notoriously difficult exercise, because it requires a comparison 
between the actual market developments induced by the decision with the developments that would have 
                                                 
24 Given that our measure of discrepancies is a dummy, we use Kendall correlation coefficients. The probability that 
the coefficient is equal to zero is reported together with (below) the coefficients.  
25 Alternative empirical investigations could of course be undertaken. In particular, one could estimate a probit model 
where the probability of observing a discrepancy is a function of the variables listed above. However, the estimation of 
such a model involves several econometric issues including endogeneity (in particular between the dependent 
variables and the expected profits of firms and competitors) that we have solved satisfactorily at the moment. This will 
be undertaken in further work.  taken place otherwise. The construction of this counterfactual is fraud with difficulties and cannot be 
realistically undertaken for a large sample of decisions. Rather than considering ex post developments, this 
paper considers an alternative ex ante benchmark, namely the anticipation by stock market of the anti-
competitive consequences of particular mergers. The reliability of this benchmark should not be 
overemphasised and our results should be seen as indicative. However, the sheer importance of the type II 
discrepancies that we observed can presumably not be explained solely by the shortcomings of the 
methodology.  
If our results support the presumption that the political economy of merger control matters, they do 
not support the common claim (in particular among US practitioners) that the role of competitors is 
important towards the discrepancies that arguably matters most, namely the type I discrepancies 
such that pro-competitive mergers are prohibited. In addition, our results emphasize the 
importance of the reforms that the Commission is considering at the moment, as presented in the 
Green Paper. In particular, to the extent that type I discrepancies are less frequent than type II 
discrepancies, and to the extent that the former cannot be explained by the lack of an explicit 
efficiency defence, our results are consistent with the view that the lack of an explicit efficiency 
defence is a significant source of discrepancy. Reform in this area may thus be welcome.  
Our results also indicate that reform may be useful in areas that are not considered by the Green 
Paper and in particular in the area of procedures and institutional reforms. Regarding procedures, 
the Green Paper envisages an increase in the effective length of phase II, to allow for a proper 
consideration of remedies. Our results suggest that more time may also help in phase I, or 
alternatively that a phase II should be opened more frequently. Regarding institutional reforms, it 
is beyond the scope of this paper to suggest how reforms could be undertaken but it would seem 
that the proper role of competitors in merger proceedings needs to be addressed.  References 
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 Appendix  
Table 2 Summary statistics 
Variable N Mean Std Dev  Median  Minimu
m  Maximum 
MISTAKE  105  0.19048 0.39456  0 0  1.00000 
N  105  53.00000 30.45488 53.00000  1.0000
0  105.00000 
PHASE1  105  0.54286 0.50055 1.00000 0  1.00000 
PCGAINS  105  5.87978 40.48817  0 0  408.92499 
NCGAINS  105  2.27365 13.25389  0.00116 0  124.52205 





BIG  105  0.73333 0.44434 1.00000 0  1.00000 





Variable N Mean Std Dev  Median Minimum  Maximum 
MISTAKE  105 0.19048 0.39456  0  0  1.00000 
N  105 53.00000 30.45488 53.00000 1.00000  105.00000 
PHASE1  105 0.54286 0.50055 1.00000  0  1.00000 
PCGAINS  105 5.87978  40.48817  0  0  408.92499 
NCGAINS  105 2.27365  13.25389 0.00116  0  124.52205 
MGAINS  105 0.63603  15.69393  0  -
82.84876  78.91254 
BIG  105 0.73333 0.44434 1.00000  0  1.00000 
CSPEC  105 0.29524 0.45834  0  0  1.00000   
Table 3 - Correlations 
 
Kendall Tau b Correlation Coefficients, N = 105 
Prob > |r| under H0: ￿=0 
 
















































































































































 List of cases. EU merger cases (1990-1999) 




M.0004 Renault  Volvo  1  07.11.90 
M.0012 Varta    Bosch 
1 2  12.04.91 
M.0024  Mitsubishi Corp.  Union Carbide Corp.  1  04.01.91 
M.0042 Alcatel  Fiat  2  21.01.91 
M.0043 Fiat  Alcatel  2  21.01.91 
M.0050 At&T  Ncr  Corporation  1  18.01.91 
M.0053 Boeing  Alenia  2  04.06.91 
M.0057  Digital Equipment Int.   Mannesmann  1  22.02.91 
M.0068 Tetrapak 
1 Alfa-Laval    2  19.03.91 
M.0081 Viag  Continental  Can  1  06.06.91 
M.0121  Ingersoll Rand Co.  Dresser Inc.  1  18.12.91 
M.0126  Accor   Wagons-Lits   2  16.12.91 
M.0129  Digital Equipment Corp.   Philips Electronics  1  26.08.91 
M.0141 Uap  Transatlantic HDG.  1  11.11.91 
M.0165  Alcatel Cable S.A.   Aeg Kabel   1  18.12.91 
M.0184  Gran Metropolitan   Cinzano S.A.  1  07.02.92 
M.0190  Nestle'   Eaux Vittel  2  25.03.92 
M.0214  Du Pont  Imperial Chemical Industries   2  03.06.92 
M.0221  Asea Brown Boveri Limited Trafalgar  Hse  1  26.05.92 
M.0222 Mannesmann  Hoesch    2  14.07.92 
M.0236 Ericsson  Ascom  1  08.07.92 
M.0253 Btr  Pirelli  1  17.08.92 
M.0259 British  Airways  .  1  27.11.92 
M.0269 Shell  Montedison  2  07.02.94 
M.0286  Zuerich Insurance Company  Municipal Mutual Insurance  1  02.04.93 
M.0308 Kali  Mdk 2  2 16.09.93 
M.0315 Mannesmann  Vlourec    Dalmine  2  20.09.93 
M.0331 Fletcher  Challenge  Methanex  1  31.03.93 
M.0354 Cyanamid    Shell  1  01.10.93 
M.0358 Pilkington  Societa' Italiana Vetro 2  2 02.09.93 
M.0361 Neste    Statoil  1  17.02.94 List of cases. EU merger cases (1990-1999) (forts.) 
M.0430 Procter  &  Gamble  Vp Schickedanz 1  2 17.02.94 
M.0437  Matra Marconi Space N.V.   British Aerospace Space 
Systems Ltd. 
1 23.08.94 
M.0447 Schneider  Electric  S.A. AEG  A.G.  1  01.08.94 
M.0458 Electrolux  AEG  A.G.   1  21.06.94 
M.0468 Siemens  Italtel (Stet) 2  2 14.10.94 
M.0469 Bertelsmann  Deutsche Bundespost Telekom 2  2 18.07.94 
M.0477 Daimler  Benz  Kässbohrer 1  2 14.10.94 
M.0479 Ingersoll  Rand  Man  1  28.07.94 
M.0484 Thyssen  Stahl  Acciai Speciali Asti , Afl Falck 1  2 21.10.94 
M.0498  Commercial Union   Suez  1  12.09.94 
M.0508  Credit Commercial De France 
(CCF) 
Berliner Handels Und Frankfurter 
Bank (BHF) 
1 28.10.94 
M.0527 Thomson  CSF  Daimler Benz AG  1  12.02.94 
M.0550 Union  Carbide  Corporation Enichem  S.P.A.  1 13.03.95 
M.0580 Daimler  Benz  Asea  Brown Boveri  2  23.06.95 
M.0582 Orkla  As  Volvo  2  23.05.95 
M.0585  VA Technologie   Trafalgar House  1  07.07.95 
M.0603  Crown Cork & Seal Company  Carnaudmetalbox Sa   2  25.07.95 
M.0619 Gencor    Lonmin  2  20.12.95 
M.0623 Kimberly-Clark    Scott Paper   2  12.09.95 
M.0632  Rhône Poulenc Rorer Inc.  Fisons Plc.)   1  21.09.95 
M.0685 Siemens  Lagardere  1  08.02.96 
M.0689 Singapore  Telecom  Belgacom 1  29.02.96 
M.0706 Alcatel  Aeg  1  03.09.96 
M.0731 Kvaerner  A.S.  Trafalgar House Plc  1  15.04.96 
M.0737 Ciba-Geigy  Sandoz  2  02.05.96 
M.0754  Anglo American Corp.  Lonmin  2  16.12.96 
M.0774  Saint Gobain  Hoechst Wacker  2  31.07.96 
M.0794 Coca-Cola  Enterprises  Cadbury Schweppes  2  13.09.96 
M.0798 General  Electric  Compunet Computer A.G.  1  19.08.96 
M.0818 Cardo  Thyssen  1  02.12.96 
M.0833  Coca Cola Company   Carslberg A/S  2  02.05.97 M.0850 Fortis  Abn-Amro  Bank  1  06.02.97 
List of cases. EU merger cases (1990-1999) (forts.) 
M.0856  British Telecom  Mci (Ii)   2  20.01.97 
M.0877  Boeing  Mcdonnell Douglas   2  19.03.97 
M.0913 Siemens  Elektrowatt    2  28.07.97 
M.0938 Guinness  Grand  Metropolitan   2  20.06.97 
M.0942 Veba  Degusta  2  02.09.97 
M.0950  Roche  (Boehringer Mannheim )  2  02.10.97 
M.0954  Bain Capital Inc.  Hoechst Ag  1  02.09.97 
M.0967 Klm  .  1  22.09.97 
M.0970  Thyssen Krupp Stahl   Itw Signode  2  22.12.97 
M.0984  Dupont De Nemours & Co.   Imperial Chemical  
Industries Plc. 
1 02.10.97 
M.0986  Bayer Group  Du Pont I De  Nemours  2  09.10.97 
M.0993 Bertelsmann  Taurus  Entertainment Canal Plus  2  22.01.98 
M.1027 Deutsche  Telekom  Bertelsmann 2  29.01.98 
M.1042  Eastman Kodak Company   Dainippon Ink & Chamicals  1  15.01.98 
M.1069 Worldcom  Mci    2  03.03.98 
M.1081  Dow Jones   General Electric  1  22.01.98 
M.1094 Caterpillar  Lucas  Varity  1  23.02.98 
M.1142  Commercial Union Plc   General Accident Plc  1  06.05.98 
M.1225  Enso Oyj  Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags Ab  2  31.07.98 
M.1232 Ingram  Tech  Data  1  17.07.98 
M.1252 At&T  Tele-Commmunications  Inc.  1  04.12.98 
M.1258 General  Electric  Finmeccanica  1  28.08.98 
M.1265  Chs Electronics Inc.  Metro Ag  1  21.08.98 
M.1332  Thomson-CSF  Lucas Varity Plc  1  21.12.98 
M.1363  Du Pont De Nemours & Co.  Hoechst AG  1  05.02.99 
M.1383  Exxon Corporation  Mobil Corporation  2  09.06.99 
M.1405  Tnt Post Group N.V.  Jet Services Sa  1  15.02.99 
M.1439  Telia 2 Telenor  2  2 15.06.99 
M.1466  Eaton Corporation  Aeroquip Vickers  1  31.03.99 
M.1476  Adecco S.A.  Delphi   1  26.03.99 
M.1524 Airtours  First  Choice  2  03.06.99 
M.1532  Bp Amoco Plc.  Atlantic Richfield Company   2  10.06.99 M.1561  Getronics N.V.  Wang Laboratories Inc.  1  15.06.99 
M.1578 Sanitec  Konink.  Sphinx  2  03.08.99 
List of cases. EU merger cases (1990-1999) (forts.) 
M.1650 ACEA  S.P.A.  Telefonica 1  01.12.99 
M.1671  Dow Chemical  Union Carbide  2  22.12.99 
M.1672  Ab Volvo  Scania Ab  2  25.10.99 
M.1673  Veba Ag  Viag Ag   2  04.02.00 
M.1687 Adecco  SA  Olsten 2  1 29.10.99 
M.1760 Mannesmann  AG  Orange Plc  1  20.12.99 
M.1797  Bae Systems+ Investor AB  Celsius AB  1  04.02.00 
M.1871  Arrow Electronics Inc.   Tekelec  1  13.04.00 
 
1 On the basis of the information on market shares obtained form the EU Commission’s report and 
about the stock prices of the other merging firms, we calculate a price reaction also for those firms 
that were not quoted in any stock market. 
2 These are public owned firms. We assume that their lobbying efforts are not through money but 
rather through political channels. 
 
In the table are reported (almost) all Phase II and a selection of Phase I 
merger cases analysed by the EU Commission during the period 
1990-1999. Some Phase II cases could not be considered because of the 
lack of information about firms’ stock prices.  
 